From the NATCA safety manual:
"Safety is the center of an air traffic controller’s universe and dictates everything a controller does. It is an unyielding taskmaster that allows for few mistakes, requires total loyalty, and comes fully equipped with demands that must be met. An air traffic controller who cannot meet these requisites does not remain an air traffic controller for very long.
Controllers, as well as other NATCA members responsible for other aspects of the National Airspace System, have made an absolute pledge to safety. In a world where there are often no clear-cut answers and where principles are often diluted, adherence to safety must remain uncorrupted and unconditional. Members of the American flying public believe that truism each and every time they board an airplane. They trust that, as far as safety is concerned, there will be no compromises and no second measures.
Many members voted for NATCA representation because they were convinced that “one voice” in Washington, D.C., was the best way to convey concerns about aviation safety to the public and was the best way to effect prompt and positive action on those concerns. That is the impetus behind the existence of the National Safety Committee, as well as the overall NATCA Safety and Technology program.
The NATCA 1988 National Convention in Atlanta mandated that the Safety Committee be established as a standing committee to provide continuity and expertise to the NATCA safety infrastructure. NATCA’s Safety Committee meets regularly to assess the air traffic control system’s safety and performance and will respond to the vital issues facing controllers and the flying public. It is made up of one representative from each of the nine NATCA regions, plus an Engineers/Architects representative and a Pilot/Controller Liaison. It examines the problems that have both a direct and indirect impact on the safety of the air traffic control system, and develops and evaluates solutions in response to these problems."
As you can see from reading this, controllers are serious about safety. This is doubly true at Newark Airport. Everyday our controllers make their best efforts to keep you and your families moving safely and quickly to your destinations.
Sometimes, we have to work around the obstacles that FAA puts in our path. It could be bad procedures, it might be horrendous management or it might even be inadequate staffing. We still get it done.
But the system isn't foolproof. Those obstacles to safety may catch up to us one day. That's why we are working hard to fix the flaws that can potentially cause a catastrophe.
At the National level, the National Air Traffic Controllers Association holds a yearly safety conference called Communicating For Safety. This conference is well attended by people from all facets of the aviation community. It's an excellent forum for discussing problems with the system and generating solutions.
I've attended for the past few years and I am always impressed by the quality of the speakers and presentations. I'm going again this year. CFS 2011 is being held at the Rio All-Suites Hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada from March 21-23. Here's a link to the CFS site: www.natcacfs.org .
Sponsorships are still available. Please check it out.
Saturday, January 22, 2011
Friday, January 21, 2011
Executive Order 13522 - Labor-Management Partnerships
Union representatives seek more input in workplace issues
GovExec.com: http://www.govexec.com/story_page.cfm?articleid=46914&oref=todaysnews
By Emily Long elong@govexec.com
January 20, 2011
Federal managers should seek employee input before major decisions are made, not after solutions are developed, according to a memo from Obama administration officials.
In a meeting on Wednesday with federal management and labor representatives, Office of Personnel Management Director John Berry and Office of Management and Budget Deputy Director for Management Jeff Zients reminded agency leaders to improve dialogue with employees by involving them before making final decisions. Managers should engage unions early in decision-making processes, as outlined in President Obama's December 2009 executive order, said the memo.
Executive Order 13522 creates labor-management partnerships governmentwide and on the agency level. The order also requires the National Council on Federal Labor-Management Relations to launch pilot programs that will test bargaining over issues not normally negotiable by law in a small group of agencies and directs management to include pre-decisional involvement "in all workplace matters to the fullest extent practicable."
READ THE REST OF THE STORY HERE: http://www.govexec.com/story_page.cfm?articleid=46914&oref=todaysnews
GovExec.com: http://www.govexec.com/story_page.cfm?articleid=46914&oref=todaysnews
By Emily Long elong@govexec.com
January 20, 2011
Federal managers should seek employee input before major decisions are made, not after solutions are developed, according to a memo from Obama administration officials.
In a meeting on Wednesday with federal management and labor representatives, Office of Personnel Management Director John Berry and Office of Management and Budget Deputy Director for Management Jeff Zients reminded agency leaders to improve dialogue with employees by involving them before making final decisions. Managers should engage unions early in decision-making processes, as outlined in President Obama's December 2009 executive order, said the memo.
Executive Order 13522 creates labor-management partnerships governmentwide and on the agency level. The order also requires the National Council on Federal Labor-Management Relations to launch pilot programs that will test bargaining over issues not normally negotiable by law in a small group of agencies and directs management to include pre-decisional involvement "in all workplace matters to the fullest extent practicable."
READ THE REST OF THE STORY HERE: http://www.govexec.com/story_page.cfm?articleid=46914&oref=todaysnews
Saturday, January 15, 2011
Prohibited Personnel Practice gets HR Specialist 45 days on the beach
Petitioner: Special Counsel
Respondents: Richard F. Lee, Diane L. Beatrez
Decision Number: 2010 MSPB 89
Docket Numbers: CB-1215-08-0014-T-1, CB-1215-08-0015-T-1
Issuance Date: May 14, 2010
Appeal Type: Disciplinary Action - Prohibited Personnel Practice
Special Counsel Actions
- Disciplinary Actions
Board Procedures/Authorities
- Criteria for Board Review (Fact Findings)
Evidence – Credibility – Circumstantial/Direct
Penalty
The Special Counsel petitioned for review of an initial decision issued by the administrative law judge that dismissed the Special Counsel’s complaints against the respondents for committing a prohibited personnel practice. The Special Counsel alleged that the respondents, in their roles as Human Resource (HR) Specialists for the U.S. Coast Guard, violated 5U.S.C. §2302(b)(6) by granting a preference or advantage to Coast Guard Senior Legal Instrument Examiner Eric Woodson (GS-8) for the purpose of improving his prospects of obtaining a promotion to a GS-11 supervisory position.
When the supervisory position was first announced, parallel vacancy announcements were issued: a delegated examining unit (DEU) announcement open to all qualified U.S. citizens; and a merit promotion announcement limited to “status eligibles.” Both announcements sought candidates for the GS-11 level only, which had the effect of generally excluding applicants below the GS-9 level. Woodson applied under the merit promotion announcement but was not referred because, as a GS-8 employee, he was ineligible for promotion to GS-11. Commander (CMDR) Laura O’Hare contacted respondent Lee to inquire as to why Woodson had not been referred, and requested that HR “reopen” the DEU announcement and create a new list for referral. Lee testified that CMDR O’Hare specifically wanted to reopen the DEU list so that Woodson’s nongovernmental experience could be considered. In an e-mail to Lee, another HR Specialist (House) instructed Lee to “have Commander O’Hare talk about lack of adequate candidates.” The DEU referral certificate bears a handwritten notation by CMDR O’Hare, stating that she wanted to re-advertise the job “[b]ecause of a lack of sufficient, well-qualified candates.” The vacancy was opened a second time, using both merit promotion and DEU announcements, but the position was still advertised only at the GS-11 level. Beatrez notified Lee via email that she had been told “the reason the job was re-advertised was to try and reach Mr. Woodson,” and explained that she was unable to qualify Woodson at the GS-11 level. Lee notified CMDR O’Hare: “They did not find [Woodson] qualified for the position based on his résumé and how he responded to the KSAs. My recommendation if you want to [consider] him is to cancel and advertise the position as a GS-9 with potential to GS-11.” CMDR O’Hare notified Lee that she wanted the position re-announced as a “GS-9 with potential to GS-11.” CMDR O’Hare further asked that the new solicitation be limited to the Los Angeles/Long Beach local area, and instructed Lee to advertise the vacancy “for the minimum amount of time.” This was done, and Woodson was selected for the position.
In analyzing the decision to re-advertise the position after the first set of vacancy announcements, the administrative law judge found that the email exchange between CMDR O’Hare and HR Specialists might have created the appearance that Lee was advising CMDR O’Hare on how to create a pretext for re-announcing the position, but he credited CMDR O’Hare’s testimony regarding her own motivations, which he found supported a different conclusion: that CMDR O’Hare’s initial failure to understand the complexities of the federal personnel system caused her to be confused as to the best way in which to structure an announcement that would capture candidates with the most relevant experience. Similarly, the administrative law judge found that the email messages regarding the decision to cancel the second set of vacancy announcements would certainly have aroused suspicions, but that the reason that these vacancy announcements were cancelled was a lack of sufficient qualified candidates in the selection pool. Regarding the third vacancy announcement, the administrative law judge credited Lee’s testimony that he believed CMDR O’Hare was not just trying to reach Woodson but was seeking to consider internal candidates who may have had qualifications similar to those of Woodson.
Holdings: The Board granted the Special Counsel’s petition for review, reversed the initial decision, and found that the respondents committed a prohibited personnel practice that warrants discipline:
1. The Special Counsel proved by preponderant evidence that both respondents violated 5U.S.C. §2302(b)(6) when they intentionally assisted CMDR O’Hare in granting an illegal preference for employment to Woodson.
a. Whether the respondents violated 5U.S.C. §2302(b)(6) turns on whether they intended to afford preferential treatment to Woodson. It is not the action itself that violates the law, but, instead, the intent behind the action.
b. The administrative law judge’s analysis of intent rests largely on credibility determinations. Under Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2002), the Board must normally defer to the judge’s credibility determinations when they are based upon the observation of the demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing. Nevertheless, the Board may substitute its own determinations of fact for those of an administrative judge, even when his credibility findings are based in part on demeanor evidence, if the Board can articulate a sound reason, based on the record, for a contrary evaluation of the evidence. The Board may overturn credibility determinations when the findings are incomplete, inconsistent with the weight of the evidence, and do not reflect the record as a whole.
c. Although the administrative law judge did not ignore the evidence that would support a finding of preferential treatment, his findings and credibility determinations are nevertheless inconsistent with the weight of the documentary evidence and do not reflect the record as a whole. In the Board’s view, the administrative law judge gave a sizable body of particularly telling circumstantial evidence too little weight in favor of some direct testimony that was inconsistent with that body of evidence. As a result, he explained away serious contradictions between the testimony and the other less favorable evidence in the record, crafting an improbable account of the events leading up to Woodson’s appointment to the vacant position.
d. The Board acknowledged that the strongest evidence of intent points not to the respondents, but to CMDR O’Hare, who retired before a hearing could be held on a proposed disciplinary action against her. Nevertheless, “given the rather blatant intention of granting a preference to Woodson that CMDR O’Hare’s communications express to the respondents,” the Board stated that it could not ignore the actions of the respondents, who are HR professionals, “in intentionally facilitating an obvious violation of section 2302(b)(6),” and interpreted that section as reaching conduct that aids and abets another who is violating the statute.
e. The Board found the facts in this case distinguishable from the typical “obey now, grieve later” situation described in Board case law. There is no evidence that CMDR O’Hare ordered the respondents to take actions that would ensure that Woodson appeared on the certificate of eligibles, and neither respondent was one of CMDR O’Hare’s subordinates.
2. After reviewing the respondents’ relative involvement in the violation of §2302(b)(6) under the relevant Douglas factors, the Board determined that the appropriate penalty for Lee was a 45-day suspension without pay, and a 10-day suspension without pay for Beatrez.
Respondents: Richard F. Lee, Diane L. Beatrez
Decision Number: 2010 MSPB 89
Docket Numbers: CB-1215-08-0014-T-1, CB-1215-08-0015-T-1
Issuance Date: May 14, 2010
Appeal Type: Disciplinary Action - Prohibited Personnel Practice
Special Counsel Actions
- Disciplinary Actions
Board Procedures/Authorities
- Criteria for Board Review (Fact Findings)
Evidence – Credibility – Circumstantial/Direct
Penalty
The Special Counsel petitioned for review of an initial decision issued by the administrative law judge that dismissed the Special Counsel’s complaints against the respondents for committing a prohibited personnel practice. The Special Counsel alleged that the respondents, in their roles as Human Resource (HR) Specialists for the U.S. Coast Guard, violated 5U.S.C. §2302(b)(6) by granting a preference or advantage to Coast Guard Senior Legal Instrument Examiner Eric Woodson (GS-8) for the purpose of improving his prospects of obtaining a promotion to a GS-11 supervisory position.
When the supervisory position was first announced, parallel vacancy announcements were issued: a delegated examining unit (DEU) announcement open to all qualified U.S. citizens; and a merit promotion announcement limited to “status eligibles.” Both announcements sought candidates for the GS-11 level only, which had the effect of generally excluding applicants below the GS-9 level. Woodson applied under the merit promotion announcement but was not referred because, as a GS-8 employee, he was ineligible for promotion to GS-11. Commander (CMDR) Laura O’Hare contacted respondent Lee to inquire as to why Woodson had not been referred, and requested that HR “reopen” the DEU announcement and create a new list for referral. Lee testified that CMDR O’Hare specifically wanted to reopen the DEU list so that Woodson’s nongovernmental experience could be considered. In an e-mail to Lee, another HR Specialist (House) instructed Lee to “have Commander O’Hare talk about lack of adequate candidates.” The DEU referral certificate bears a handwritten notation by CMDR O’Hare, stating that she wanted to re-advertise the job “[b]ecause of a lack of sufficient, well-qualified candates.” The vacancy was opened a second time, using both merit promotion and DEU announcements, but the position was still advertised only at the GS-11 level. Beatrez notified Lee via email that she had been told “the reason the job was re-advertised was to try and reach Mr. Woodson,” and explained that she was unable to qualify Woodson at the GS-11 level. Lee notified CMDR O’Hare: “They did not find [Woodson] qualified for the position based on his résumé and how he responded to the KSAs. My recommendation if you want to [consider] him is to cancel and advertise the position as a GS-9 with potential to GS-11.” CMDR O’Hare notified Lee that she wanted the position re-announced as a “GS-9 with potential to GS-11.” CMDR O’Hare further asked that the new solicitation be limited to the Los Angeles/Long Beach local area, and instructed Lee to advertise the vacancy “for the minimum amount of time.” This was done, and Woodson was selected for the position.
In analyzing the decision to re-advertise the position after the first set of vacancy announcements, the administrative law judge found that the email exchange between CMDR O’Hare and HR Specialists might have created the appearance that Lee was advising CMDR O’Hare on how to create a pretext for re-announcing the position, but he credited CMDR O’Hare’s testimony regarding her own motivations, which he found supported a different conclusion: that CMDR O’Hare’s initial failure to understand the complexities of the federal personnel system caused her to be confused as to the best way in which to structure an announcement that would capture candidates with the most relevant experience. Similarly, the administrative law judge found that the email messages regarding the decision to cancel the second set of vacancy announcements would certainly have aroused suspicions, but that the reason that these vacancy announcements were cancelled was a lack of sufficient qualified candidates in the selection pool. Regarding the third vacancy announcement, the administrative law judge credited Lee’s testimony that he believed CMDR O’Hare was not just trying to reach Woodson but was seeking to consider internal candidates who may have had qualifications similar to those of Woodson.
Holdings: The Board granted the Special Counsel’s petition for review, reversed the initial decision, and found that the respondents committed a prohibited personnel practice that warrants discipline:
1. The Special Counsel proved by preponderant evidence that both respondents violated 5U.S.C. §2302(b)(6) when they intentionally assisted CMDR O’Hare in granting an illegal preference for employment to Woodson.
a. Whether the respondents violated 5U.S.C. §2302(b)(6) turns on whether they intended to afford preferential treatment to Woodson. It is not the action itself that violates the law, but, instead, the intent behind the action.
b. The administrative law judge’s analysis of intent rests largely on credibility determinations. Under Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2002), the Board must normally defer to the judge’s credibility determinations when they are based upon the observation of the demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing. Nevertheless, the Board may substitute its own determinations of fact for those of an administrative judge, even when his credibility findings are based in part on demeanor evidence, if the Board can articulate a sound reason, based on the record, for a contrary evaluation of the evidence. The Board may overturn credibility determinations when the findings are incomplete, inconsistent with the weight of the evidence, and do not reflect the record as a whole.
c. Although the administrative law judge did not ignore the evidence that would support a finding of preferential treatment, his findings and credibility determinations are nevertheless inconsistent with the weight of the documentary evidence and do not reflect the record as a whole. In the Board’s view, the administrative law judge gave a sizable body of particularly telling circumstantial evidence too little weight in favor of some direct testimony that was inconsistent with that body of evidence. As a result, he explained away serious contradictions between the testimony and the other less favorable evidence in the record, crafting an improbable account of the events leading up to Woodson’s appointment to the vacant position.
d. The Board acknowledged that the strongest evidence of intent points not to the respondents, but to CMDR O’Hare, who retired before a hearing could be held on a proposed disciplinary action against her. Nevertheless, “given the rather blatant intention of granting a preference to Woodson that CMDR O’Hare’s communications express to the respondents,” the Board stated that it could not ignore the actions of the respondents, who are HR professionals, “in intentionally facilitating an obvious violation of section 2302(b)(6),” and interpreted that section as reaching conduct that aids and abets another who is violating the statute.
e. The Board found the facts in this case distinguishable from the typical “obey now, grieve later” situation described in Board case law. There is no evidence that CMDR O’Hare ordered the respondents to take actions that would ensure that Woodson appeared on the certificate of eligibles, and neither respondent was one of CMDR O’Hare’s subordinates.
2. After reviewing the respondents’ relative involvement in the violation of §2302(b)(6) under the relevant Douglas factors, the Board determined that the appropriate penalty for Lee was a 45-day suspension without pay, and a 10-day suspension without pay for Beatrez.
Friday, January 7, 2011
I think my point has been made
I've gotten my point across to all of the parties to this issue with Masterson so I'll discontinue my posts until further notice.
The definition of Buffoon
From Google dictionary;
buf·foon Noun /bəˈfo͞on
1.A ridiculous but amusing person; a clown
I was thinking about some of the things done and said by Ed Masterson over his at the Air Traffic Manager Newark Tower and this word came to mind.
There are numerous things I could cite, but the most buffoonish thing I think Ed ever said to me was that after 20 years of not working airplanes at a major airport, he could walk upstairs, plug in a headset and run the Overhead runway 29 operation better than most of the controllers at EWR.
This might be a little technical for the non-air traffic controllers out there but to keep it simple - this is probably the toughest operation we (used to) run at Newark Airport. There are so many things going on, you're looking in so many directions to keep everything under control and on top of it all, your timing needs to be impeccable to hit the gaps on the landings and the departures. If one thing goes awry, it's a giant sh*tstorm for sure. (See DOT Inspector General's report)
To let you know a bit more about how hard it is to work at Newark as a controller, our current success rate among controllers who come from other facilities is about 30%. Yes, 7 out of 10 people WHO ARE ALREADY AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS FAIL TO MAKE IT AT NEWARK!! And we don't even run the overhead runway 29 operation anymore!
Anyway, this BUFFOON ED MASTERSON with his GIANT EGO thinks after 20 years or so he can just jump in and work it like a pro. Do you see why this word popped into my mind? A ridiculous but amusing person - a perfect description of Ed Masterson.
buf·foon Noun /bəˈfo͞on
1.A ridiculous but amusing person; a clown
I was thinking about some of the things done and said by Ed Masterson over his at the Air Traffic Manager Newark Tower and this word came to mind.
There are numerous things I could cite, but the most buffoonish thing I think Ed ever said to me was that after 20 years of not working airplanes at a major airport, he could walk upstairs, plug in a headset and run the Overhead runway 29 operation better than most of the controllers at EWR.
This might be a little technical for the non-air traffic controllers out there but to keep it simple - this is probably the toughest operation we (used to) run at Newark Airport. There are so many things going on, you're looking in so many directions to keep everything under control and on top of it all, your timing needs to be impeccable to hit the gaps on the landings and the departures. If one thing goes awry, it's a giant sh*tstorm for sure. (See DOT Inspector General's report)
To let you know a bit more about how hard it is to work at Newark as a controller, our current success rate among controllers who come from other facilities is about 30%. Yes, 7 out of 10 people WHO ARE ALREADY AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS FAIL TO MAKE IT AT NEWARK!! And we don't even run the overhead runway 29 operation anymore!
Anyway, this BUFFOON ED MASTERSON with his GIANT EGO thinks after 20 years or so he can just jump in and work it like a pro. Do you see why this word popped into my mind? A ridiculous but amusing person - a perfect description of Ed Masterson.
Thursday, January 6, 2011
MSPB decision page 12 - Ed Masterson violates federal law 5 USC 2302(b)(8)
This is page 12 of the December 22, 2009 Merit Systems Protection Board decision by Judge Ruggiero where she ruled that Ed Masterson violated federal law - the Whistleblower Protection Act and committed a Prohibited Personnel Practice under 5 USC 2302(b)(8). Ed Masterson retaliated against a federal whistleblower who disclosed three unsafe air traffic procedures at Newark Liberty Airport. These procedures have now either been corrected, stopped or just no longer used. There haven't been any more near-collisions at Newark Airport since these procedures were corrected or stopped. I think that speaks volumes. In fact, on the one procedure the runway 22 Left/runway 11 simultaneous landings, the incidence of go-arounds (aborted landings) was reduced by 80%. That is a staggering number.Ed Masterson ignored the danger and even went as far as to put a policy in place to bring the airplanes closer together. Yes, even closer! I guess a near-collision isn't close enough for this numbskull FAA manager. It really pissed him off when he was presented evidence that conflicted with his warped view of reality. Hence, the retaliation.
More to come on this.
Wednesday, January 5, 2011
Another ridiculous Ed Masterson policy - Overhead procedure runway 29 at EWR
At Newark Airport we had this little problem with near-collisions of aircraft a few years ago. There were a couple of seriously deficient procedures that needed fixing. I brought these safety problems to Ed Masterson's attention and he basically told me to shove it. One specific safety problem involved the Overhead Runway 29 approach. We had 3 near-collisions in a year while using this wacked-out procedure.
So, what does the Captain Chaos of air traffic control decide to do....He institutes a policy at Newark Airport that BRINGS THE AIRPLANES EVEN CLOSER TOGETHER!! That's right, this idiot believed that if you allow the controllers to get the planes closer together, the near-collisions will go away...WTF!
Yes taxpayers, you pay this numbskull ED MASTERSON over $180,000 plus benefits and bonuses to put you and your family in the path of a jet aircraft hurtling through the air at 200 mph. And by the way - did I tell you a JUDGE RULED HE VIOLATED FEDERAL LAW. Yup, he's still employed by the guardian of the skies - the Federal Aviation Administration.
Well, I'm just a lowly air traffic controller and I don't have a big, fancy "manager" title, but I know that if you have some near-collisions going on that you don't try to put them even closer together.
What I did is actually do an analysis of the procedure and provide an effective solution to eliminate to risk of collision. I wrote a 'white paper' aptly named Deficient Air Traffic Procedures at Newark Liberty International Airport and their Impacts on Aircraft Safety. I submitted my paper to the House of Representatives - Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: Aviation Subcommittee.
Here is an excerpt from the paper regarding the runway 29 overhead procedure that Ed Masterson screwed up even more.
Issue: Runway 29 Overhead Approach Procedure
Background
The Runway 29 Overhead Approach Procedure is designed to take advantage of the shorter, crossing runway (Runway 29) when Newark Airport is operating on the Northeast flow (Runway 4 Right arrivals). The aircraft for Runway 4 Right approach from the southwest, descending on final for the runway while the Runway 29 arrivals approach from the west travelling eastbound and fly directly over the approaching Runway 4 Right traffic. The eastbound aircraft for then descends and enters a left traffic pattern for Runway 29 prior to the Hudson River. The Local controller then sequences the Runway 29 arrival to fit with the Runway 4 Right arrivals so both aircraft land with the appropriate separation. The Runway 29 aircraft are required to execute visual approaches on this procedure.
Theoretical and Practical Application
The visual approach , in many circumstances, is valuable tool for the air traffic controller. It allows him to reduce separation standards and in some cases relieves him of the burden of providing wake turbulence separation between aircraft. It also reduces workload on approach controllers by removing the obligation of placing an aircraft on an instrument approach to an airport. This frees the controller to work on other safety issues and provide additional services.
In this particular case, the use of the visual approach without published course guidance, approach minima and a valid missed approach/go-around procedure creates unnecessary safety hazards. This complex approach, in the very congested and complex airspace of the New York metropolitan area is not the proper setting for the unregulated use of visual procedures.
This unpublished approach procedure was designed to be used by aircraft operating under Visual Flight Rules (VFR). Aircraft operating under VFR are not required to be separated by the stringent standards associated with Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flights. The current procedure has not been amended to consider the change in users from VFR to IFR flights.
Safety Hazards Associated with the Procedure
There is no published procedure to establish course guidance:
The current structure of the procedure allows for the Runway 29 arrival to approach the airport from almost any angle and any point in space that is west of Newark. The lack of consistency creates unique problems for the Tower Local and Class Bravo Airspace (CBA) controllers. The random appearance of flights at various points requires the controllers to react quickly to resolve any conflict with other aircraft under their control.
The pilots are instructed by the Tower controller to aim for a point at the airport over the Runway 4 “numbers”, the large painted digits at the approach end of the runway. This may seem like a reasonable visual target, but in reality pilots may vary by more than a mile either south or north of the correct position. This inaccuracy causes a potential collision hazard with the aircraft either on the Runway 4 Right approach or with aircraft departing Runway 4 Left. In some rare cases, pilots have deviated by as much as three miles south of the required point while simultaneously descending on the approach. These deviations are serious and place the aircraft directly in the final approach path of the primary runway. Generally, these are cases where a pilot is unfamiliar with Newark Airport and specifically this uncharted approach, causing him to become disoriented.
The approach relies too heavily on visual separation:
When the aircraft approach Newark from the west, the TRACON controller does not provide any radar separation with the Runway 4 Right arrival aircraft. It is incumbent upon the Tower controller to establish either pilot-to-pilot visual separation or he provide the visual separation . Unfortunately, in this configuration and with the workload the controller already has, it is difficult and time consuming to establish either form of visual separation. Many variables such as the aircraft’s profile, weather, controller workload or other factors may prevent the establishment of visual separation. Without the aid of visual separation, the controller is required to maintain the standard three miles lateral separation or 1000 feet vertically. When a controller cannot establish visual separation, he must quickly ensure separation between the aircraft. Unfortunately, the Tower controller is not authorized to climb the inbound aircraft because he does not control the airspace above 2000 feet and he is limited in where he can vector the aircraft by the Teterboro and Morristown arrivals. He is effectively placed in an untenable situation that will likely result in a loss of separation.
There is no built-in separation for contingent events:
Since the approach is not charted, there are no explicit directions for pilots to follow in the event of a contingency. These types of events, such as loss of communications, wrong frequency assignments, loss of radar and any other abnormal event that disrupts the standard operation introduce uncertainty. A controller encountering these situations may not be able to provide separation services to the inbound aircraft raising the potential for a catastrophic event.
Lack of effective transfer of communications and control:
There is guidance for the TRACON controller to transfer control and communications to the Tower controller at eight miles from the airport. Prior to transfer, aircraft are verbally instructed to maintain 2000 feet. At times, pilots cannot visually acquire the airport prior to the eight mile mark and cannot be cleared for the visual approach. In these events, it is common for the TRACON controller to retain control of the aircraft until the pilot can proceed visually to the airport. Unfortunately, when the Tower controller finally receives control and communications, he does not have adequate time to establish the necessary visual or radar separation.
Pilots must fly an unorthodox, unstabilized approach, increasing the risk of missed approaches/go-arounds:
The approach to Runway 29 in this configuration requires the aircraft to fly overhead the field from west to east, making a descending left 180 degree turn to align with the landing runway. Many times, it is necessary for the Tower controller to instruct the pilot to make a shortened approach to sequence with the landing traffic on Runway 4 Right. This maneuver does not allow the pilot to properly stabilize the aircraft for landing and increases the potential for go-arounds. This is especially significant during the autumn when the prevailing wind shifts to the northwest and strong gusts are prevalent.
The routine descent profile is outside normal approach procedure parameters:
The routine application of this procedure allows pilots approximately four miles to descend from 2000 feet to touchdown in a banking left turn with a descent rate of approximately 500 feet per mile. Conversely, the optimum descent rate per mile on final approach is 318 feet per mile with a maximum of 400 feet per mile . This steep descent profile combined with the banked approach adds complexity to the pilot’s approach to the runway.
There is no protected missed approach/go-around (aborted landings) airspace:
Because this is an unpublished visual approach procedure, there is no designated missed approach procedure or protected upwind airspace to safeguard the aircraft if it cannot land. The current procedure does not provide positive separation of aircraft on the upwind leg after an aborted landing.
Missed approaches/Go-arounds directly conflict with Teterboro Runway 6 arrivals:
When an aborted landing occurs, the aircraft is almost immediately endangered by other aircraft landing at Teterboro Airport and also by subsequent aircraft inbound to Newark Airport on the Overhead Runway 29 procedure. Teterboro Airport’s ILS Runway 6 final approach course lies approximately four miles off the departure end of Newark Runway 29. The aircraft on the Teterboro approach and regularly at 2000 feet and will begin descent on the ILS glide path shortly. The aircraft aborting on Runway 29 is on a converging course with those aircraft and is required to climb to a minimum altitude of 1600 feet due to obstacles in the vicinity. As the required separation between these aircraft is three miles laterally or 1000 feet vertically, there is virtually no option for the Newark Tower controller to keep the aircraft safely separated. Additionally, visual separation cannot be applied in this circumstance as it is prohibited by FAA Order 7110.65S 7-2-1 . The result is an almost instant loss of separation, endangering the aircraft involved.
FAA is instructing controllers to misapply VFR separation rules:
FAA management at Newark has instructed controllers to attempt to retain the aircraft aborting the approach in the “VFR pattern” thus supposedly alleviating the controller of the responsibility of providing the necessary radar separation. This technique was previously used during a period when the primary users of this approach were turboprop aircraft operating under Visual Flight Rules (VFR). While this was a legal application of the rules with those aircraft, it is illegal for use with the Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flights that currently utilize the approach. Keeping the IFR aircraft in the visual pattern also places them below the 1600 foot MVA and in violation of FAA regulations.
Also, when conflicting with the Teterboro arrivals, VFR aircraft are not subject to the three mile or 1000 feet separation requirement.
Missed approaches/Go-arounds conflict with other aircraft inbound on this approach:
Aircraft aborting landings on Runway 29 during this operation not only potentially conflict with aircraft on the Teterboro ILS Runway 6 approach, but also with other aircraft conducting the Overhead 29 approach to Newark. There is generally a 25 mile in-trail restriction on aircraft conducting the Overhead Runway 29 approach. This is necessary because an aircraft aborting on Runway 29 is in conflict with the succeeding aircraft on the same approach. These two aircraft are on reciprocal courses and cannot be separated effectively.
Solutions
Properly chart and publish the procedure:
Properly charting and publishing the procedure will standardize its use, ensuring consistency among pilots flying the approach into Newark and reducing confusion. This consistency will allow controllers to handle these aircraft more easily, thus increasing safety and efficiency. Publication of an official approach procedure will also mandate the establishment of acceptable weather minima under which the approach can be conducted. Currently, the operation’s weather minima are subjective and set by the operational supervisor on duty. FAA should develop a charted visual or similar procedure that provides instrument course guidance throughout and a specified point where the pilot must proceed visually or be resequenced.
Provide instrument course guidance:
The current application of the procedure does not dictate a track that aircraft must fly to safely proceed on the approach for Runway 29. Creating a required path to fly will reduce the uncertainty associated with the current operation and mitigate the hazards caused by aircraft drifting north or south of the expected fly-over point on the airfield (i.e. the runway numbers). Course guidance on the track can be provided by a number of navigational aids in the area and can be overlaid with newer technologies like GPS or RNAV for use with NextGen systems. The course guidance should not exclude older existing technologies such as VOR in order to maintain maximum flexibility of use.
Recommendation: In order to provide clearance from the Teterboro ILS Runway 6, Newark Runway 4 Right arrivals and Runway 29 aborted landing airspace, the inbound leg should start at approximately 240 degrees and 10 to 12 miles from the fly-over point.
Build-in vertical separation at conflict points:
The establishment of a track will define the points of conflict and altitude restrictions can be included to ensure separation between aircraft. This addition will reduce the likelihood of separation loss in contingency situations as well as reduce controller workload.
Create a defined transfer of control point:
A defined course and set altitude restrictions will allow for a set transfer point from the TRACON to the Tower. The clarification of the transfer point and definition of each controller’s responsibilities will reduce operational deviations and errors. Transfer errors will be reduced as pilots will expect transfer at a standard point and the frequencies will be included in the chart.
Recommendation: The transfer point should be a point where the pilot is separated from traffic, has acquired visual contact with the airport and can proceed on track.
Reduce the rate of descent on the final segment of the approach:
The new track should include the downwind and base legs of the approach to provide pilots a landing pattern that ensures obstacle clearance and a reasonable descent profile. By establishing a downwind leg length of three miles from the fly-over point to the base leg turn, the effective final segment length is approximately seven miles. This increase in length allows for the fly-over altitude to be raised to approximately 2600 feet and reduces the rate of descent to approximately 370 feet/mile from 500 feet/mile, bringing it within FAA regulation parameters. This change should provide for a more stabilized approach and reduce incidences of aborted landings. Also, the increase in fly-over altitude provides the necessary 1000 feet vertical separation between the inbound and aborting aircraft.
Tower controllers sequencing the Runway 29 arrivals with the Runway 4 Right arrivals may find the task easier with a set pattern as the time from fly-over to touchdown will be more consistent. Currently, the pattern flown by pilots during this operation varies widely and can disrupt the timing of the controller’s sequence. If necessary, controllers may still alter the pattern slightly to accommodate sequencing without greatly compromising the final descent profile. Speed adjustments would also be effective in adjusting the sequence.
Create aborted landing protected zone:
IFR aircraft aborting landings on Runway 29 must climb to at least 1600 feet in order to comply with the minimum vectoring altitude (MVA) in the vicinity of Newark. To ensure separation of the aircraft with the Teterboro ILS 6 traffic, an altitude restriction of 2600 feet must be established on the ILS 6 until the aircraft are laterally separated or the other applicable radar separation can be applied (i.e. divergence).
Alternatively, Teterboro can discontinue the use of the ILS 6 and instead utilize the VOR-DME Runway 6 which does not conflict with Runway 29. Since the Overhead Runway 29 approach is not used during periods of poor weather, the use of the non-precision VOR-DME approach at Teterboro should not present a problem.
Recommendation: Teterboro should use the VOR-DME Runway 6 during the usage of this procedure.
The changes will increase efficiency and reduce delays by reducing mile-in-trail restrictions:
By eliminating the traffic conflicts between the successive aircraft on the approach, the 25 mile-in-trail restriction can be reduced to 7 to 10 miles, more than doubling the hourly landing capacity on Runway 29. This reduction will add an additional four to six arrivals per hour and increase peak arrival period capacity by approximately 8-12% when operating on the northeast flow. This will provide some relief of arrival delays into Newark when the delays are a result of volume and airport configuration.
The airlines will experience cost and on time benefits:
The reduction of delays will benefit the financial health of the airlines utilizing Newark, especially Continental Airlines. By improving on time performance, reducing holding pattern fuel burn and diverted flights, the cost of operating aircraft out of Newark will be reduced. Additionally, many carriers use Newark as their gateway to connect with trans-Atlantic and trans-polar flights that are significant revenue generators for the companies. There is a two-fold benefit here; the connecting flights arrive on time and allow passengers to make their connections to the overseas flight, and the long-haul aircraft arrive on time and are available for those passengers.
Passengers benefit:
Ultimately, the public benefits by having flights arrive on time. Passengers arrive at their destinations without extensive ground or in-flight delay and are able to make connections more easily, potentially mitigating some of the stress that has been associated with air travel over the past few years.
Summary
The solutions proposed here will enhance the safety and capacity at Newark Airport while operating on the Northeast flow. The existing operation is subject to three main uncontrolled conflict points and a number of uncertainties that can cause confusion with pilots and controllers. By positively controlling the conflicts and creating inherent separation, the operation becomes more certain and less workload intensive. The publication of the procedure with instrument course guidance puts pilots and controllers “on the same page” allowing each to know what to expect from the other. Safety and efficiency are enhanced and capacity is increased, making this a win-win situation for all parties involved.
OK FAA, IT'S TIME TO FIRE ED MASTERSON FOR HIS VIOLATION OF FEDERAL LAW. His actions jeopardized the lives of the passengers flying in and out of EWR. HE RETALIATED AGAINST A WHISTLEBLOWER WHO WAS PROTECTING THE SAFETY OF AIRCRAFT AT NEWARK AIRPORT. A MSPB JUDGE SAID SO!!!! GET CRACKIN' FAA. TIME FOR THIS GUY TO GO.
So, what does the Captain Chaos of air traffic control decide to do....He institutes a policy at Newark Airport that BRINGS THE AIRPLANES EVEN CLOSER TOGETHER!! That's right, this idiot believed that if you allow the controllers to get the planes closer together, the near-collisions will go away...WTF!
Yes taxpayers, you pay this numbskull ED MASTERSON over $180,000 plus benefits and bonuses to put you and your family in the path of a jet aircraft hurtling through the air at 200 mph. And by the way - did I tell you a JUDGE RULED HE VIOLATED FEDERAL LAW. Yup, he's still employed by the guardian of the skies - the Federal Aviation Administration.
Well, I'm just a lowly air traffic controller and I don't have a big, fancy "manager" title, but I know that if you have some near-collisions going on that you don't try to put them even closer together.
What I did is actually do an analysis of the procedure and provide an effective solution to eliminate to risk of collision. I wrote a 'white paper' aptly named Deficient Air Traffic Procedures at Newark Liberty International Airport and their Impacts on Aircraft Safety. I submitted my paper to the House of Representatives - Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: Aviation Subcommittee.
Here is an excerpt from the paper regarding the runway 29 overhead procedure that Ed Masterson screwed up even more.
Issue: Runway 29 Overhead Approach Procedure
Background
The Runway 29 Overhead Approach Procedure is designed to take advantage of the shorter, crossing runway (Runway 29) when Newark Airport is operating on the Northeast flow (Runway 4 Right arrivals). The aircraft for Runway 4 Right approach from the southwest, descending on final for the runway while the Runway 29 arrivals approach from the west travelling eastbound and fly directly over the approaching Runway 4 Right traffic. The eastbound aircraft for then descends and enters a left traffic pattern for Runway 29 prior to the Hudson River. The Local controller then sequences the Runway 29 arrival to fit with the Runway 4 Right arrivals so both aircraft land with the appropriate separation. The Runway 29 aircraft are required to execute visual approaches on this procedure.
Theoretical and Practical Application
The visual approach , in many circumstances, is valuable tool for the air traffic controller. It allows him to reduce separation standards and in some cases relieves him of the burden of providing wake turbulence separation between aircraft. It also reduces workload on approach controllers by removing the obligation of placing an aircraft on an instrument approach to an airport. This frees the controller to work on other safety issues and provide additional services.
In this particular case, the use of the visual approach without published course guidance, approach minima and a valid missed approach/go-around procedure creates unnecessary safety hazards. This complex approach, in the very congested and complex airspace of the New York metropolitan area is not the proper setting for the unregulated use of visual procedures.
This unpublished approach procedure was designed to be used by aircraft operating under Visual Flight Rules (VFR). Aircraft operating under VFR are not required to be separated by the stringent standards associated with Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flights. The current procedure has not been amended to consider the change in users from VFR to IFR flights.
Safety Hazards Associated with the Procedure
There is no published procedure to establish course guidance:
The current structure of the procedure allows for the Runway 29 arrival to approach the airport from almost any angle and any point in space that is west of Newark. The lack of consistency creates unique problems for the Tower Local and Class Bravo Airspace (CBA) controllers. The random appearance of flights at various points requires the controllers to react quickly to resolve any conflict with other aircraft under their control.
The pilots are instructed by the Tower controller to aim for a point at the airport over the Runway 4 “numbers”, the large painted digits at the approach end of the runway. This may seem like a reasonable visual target, but in reality pilots may vary by more than a mile either south or north of the correct position. This inaccuracy causes a potential collision hazard with the aircraft either on the Runway 4 Right approach or with aircraft departing Runway 4 Left. In some rare cases, pilots have deviated by as much as three miles south of the required point while simultaneously descending on the approach. These deviations are serious and place the aircraft directly in the final approach path of the primary runway. Generally, these are cases where a pilot is unfamiliar with Newark Airport and specifically this uncharted approach, causing him to become disoriented.
The approach relies too heavily on visual separation:
When the aircraft approach Newark from the west, the TRACON controller does not provide any radar separation with the Runway 4 Right arrival aircraft. It is incumbent upon the Tower controller to establish either pilot-to-pilot visual separation or he provide the visual separation . Unfortunately, in this configuration and with the workload the controller already has, it is difficult and time consuming to establish either form of visual separation. Many variables such as the aircraft’s profile, weather, controller workload or other factors may prevent the establishment of visual separation. Without the aid of visual separation, the controller is required to maintain the standard three miles lateral separation or 1000 feet vertically. When a controller cannot establish visual separation, he must quickly ensure separation between the aircraft. Unfortunately, the Tower controller is not authorized to climb the inbound aircraft because he does not control the airspace above 2000 feet and he is limited in where he can vector the aircraft by the Teterboro and Morristown arrivals. He is effectively placed in an untenable situation that will likely result in a loss of separation.
There is no built-in separation for contingent events:
Since the approach is not charted, there are no explicit directions for pilots to follow in the event of a contingency. These types of events, such as loss of communications, wrong frequency assignments, loss of radar and any other abnormal event that disrupts the standard operation introduce uncertainty. A controller encountering these situations may not be able to provide separation services to the inbound aircraft raising the potential for a catastrophic event.
Lack of effective transfer of communications and control:
There is guidance for the TRACON controller to transfer control and communications to the Tower controller at eight miles from the airport. Prior to transfer, aircraft are verbally instructed to maintain 2000 feet. At times, pilots cannot visually acquire the airport prior to the eight mile mark and cannot be cleared for the visual approach. In these events, it is common for the TRACON controller to retain control of the aircraft until the pilot can proceed visually to the airport. Unfortunately, when the Tower controller finally receives control and communications, he does not have adequate time to establish the necessary visual or radar separation.
Pilots must fly an unorthodox, unstabilized approach, increasing the risk of missed approaches/go-arounds:
The approach to Runway 29 in this configuration requires the aircraft to fly overhead the field from west to east, making a descending left 180 degree turn to align with the landing runway. Many times, it is necessary for the Tower controller to instruct the pilot to make a shortened approach to sequence with the landing traffic on Runway 4 Right. This maneuver does not allow the pilot to properly stabilize the aircraft for landing and increases the potential for go-arounds. This is especially significant during the autumn when the prevailing wind shifts to the northwest and strong gusts are prevalent.
The routine descent profile is outside normal approach procedure parameters:
The routine application of this procedure allows pilots approximately four miles to descend from 2000 feet to touchdown in a banking left turn with a descent rate of approximately 500 feet per mile. Conversely, the optimum descent rate per mile on final approach is 318 feet per mile with a maximum of 400 feet per mile . This steep descent profile combined with the banked approach adds complexity to the pilot’s approach to the runway.
There is no protected missed approach/go-around (aborted landings) airspace:
Because this is an unpublished visual approach procedure, there is no designated missed approach procedure or protected upwind airspace to safeguard the aircraft if it cannot land. The current procedure does not provide positive separation of aircraft on the upwind leg after an aborted landing.
Missed approaches/Go-arounds directly conflict with Teterboro Runway 6 arrivals:
When an aborted landing occurs, the aircraft is almost immediately endangered by other aircraft landing at Teterboro Airport and also by subsequent aircraft inbound to Newark Airport on the Overhead Runway 29 procedure. Teterboro Airport’s ILS Runway 6 final approach course lies approximately four miles off the departure end of Newark Runway 29. The aircraft on the Teterboro approach and regularly at 2000 feet and will begin descent on the ILS glide path shortly. The aircraft aborting on Runway 29 is on a converging course with those aircraft and is required to climb to a minimum altitude of 1600 feet due to obstacles in the vicinity. As the required separation between these aircraft is three miles laterally or 1000 feet vertically, there is virtually no option for the Newark Tower controller to keep the aircraft safely separated. Additionally, visual separation cannot be applied in this circumstance as it is prohibited by FAA Order 7110.65S 7-2-1 . The result is an almost instant loss of separation, endangering the aircraft involved.
FAA is instructing controllers to misapply VFR separation rules:
FAA management at Newark has instructed controllers to attempt to retain the aircraft aborting the approach in the “VFR pattern” thus supposedly alleviating the controller of the responsibility of providing the necessary radar separation. This technique was previously used during a period when the primary users of this approach were turboprop aircraft operating under Visual Flight Rules (VFR). While this was a legal application of the rules with those aircraft, it is illegal for use with the Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flights that currently utilize the approach. Keeping the IFR aircraft in the visual pattern also places them below the 1600 foot MVA and in violation of FAA regulations.
Also, when conflicting with the Teterboro arrivals, VFR aircraft are not subject to the three mile or 1000 feet separation requirement.
Missed approaches/Go-arounds conflict with other aircraft inbound on this approach:
Aircraft aborting landings on Runway 29 during this operation not only potentially conflict with aircraft on the Teterboro ILS Runway 6 approach, but also with other aircraft conducting the Overhead 29 approach to Newark. There is generally a 25 mile in-trail restriction on aircraft conducting the Overhead Runway 29 approach. This is necessary because an aircraft aborting on Runway 29 is in conflict with the succeeding aircraft on the same approach. These two aircraft are on reciprocal courses and cannot be separated effectively.
Solutions
Properly chart and publish the procedure:
Properly charting and publishing the procedure will standardize its use, ensuring consistency among pilots flying the approach into Newark and reducing confusion. This consistency will allow controllers to handle these aircraft more easily, thus increasing safety and efficiency. Publication of an official approach procedure will also mandate the establishment of acceptable weather minima under which the approach can be conducted. Currently, the operation’s weather minima are subjective and set by the operational supervisor on duty. FAA should develop a charted visual or similar procedure that provides instrument course guidance throughout and a specified point where the pilot must proceed visually or be resequenced.
Provide instrument course guidance:
The current application of the procedure does not dictate a track that aircraft must fly to safely proceed on the approach for Runway 29. Creating a required path to fly will reduce the uncertainty associated with the current operation and mitigate the hazards caused by aircraft drifting north or south of the expected fly-over point on the airfield (i.e. the runway numbers). Course guidance on the track can be provided by a number of navigational aids in the area and can be overlaid with newer technologies like GPS or RNAV for use with NextGen systems. The course guidance should not exclude older existing technologies such as VOR in order to maintain maximum flexibility of use.
Recommendation: In order to provide clearance from the Teterboro ILS Runway 6, Newark Runway 4 Right arrivals and Runway 29 aborted landing airspace, the inbound leg should start at approximately 240 degrees and 10 to 12 miles from the fly-over point.
Build-in vertical separation at conflict points:
The establishment of a track will define the points of conflict and altitude restrictions can be included to ensure separation between aircraft. This addition will reduce the likelihood of separation loss in contingency situations as well as reduce controller workload.
Create a defined transfer of control point:
A defined course and set altitude restrictions will allow for a set transfer point from the TRACON to the Tower. The clarification of the transfer point and definition of each controller’s responsibilities will reduce operational deviations and errors. Transfer errors will be reduced as pilots will expect transfer at a standard point and the frequencies will be included in the chart.
Recommendation: The transfer point should be a point where the pilot is separated from traffic, has acquired visual contact with the airport and can proceed on track.
Reduce the rate of descent on the final segment of the approach:
The new track should include the downwind and base legs of the approach to provide pilots a landing pattern that ensures obstacle clearance and a reasonable descent profile. By establishing a downwind leg length of three miles from the fly-over point to the base leg turn, the effective final segment length is approximately seven miles. This increase in length allows for the fly-over altitude to be raised to approximately 2600 feet and reduces the rate of descent to approximately 370 feet/mile from 500 feet/mile, bringing it within FAA regulation parameters. This change should provide for a more stabilized approach and reduce incidences of aborted landings. Also, the increase in fly-over altitude provides the necessary 1000 feet vertical separation between the inbound and aborting aircraft.
Tower controllers sequencing the Runway 29 arrivals with the Runway 4 Right arrivals may find the task easier with a set pattern as the time from fly-over to touchdown will be more consistent. Currently, the pattern flown by pilots during this operation varies widely and can disrupt the timing of the controller’s sequence. If necessary, controllers may still alter the pattern slightly to accommodate sequencing without greatly compromising the final descent profile. Speed adjustments would also be effective in adjusting the sequence.
Create aborted landing protected zone:
IFR aircraft aborting landings on Runway 29 must climb to at least 1600 feet in order to comply with the minimum vectoring altitude (MVA) in the vicinity of Newark. To ensure separation of the aircraft with the Teterboro ILS 6 traffic, an altitude restriction of 2600 feet must be established on the ILS 6 until the aircraft are laterally separated or the other applicable radar separation can be applied (i.e. divergence).
Alternatively, Teterboro can discontinue the use of the ILS 6 and instead utilize the VOR-DME Runway 6 which does not conflict with Runway 29. Since the Overhead Runway 29 approach is not used during periods of poor weather, the use of the non-precision VOR-DME approach at Teterboro should not present a problem.
Recommendation: Teterboro should use the VOR-DME Runway 6 during the usage of this procedure.
The changes will increase efficiency and reduce delays by reducing mile-in-trail restrictions:
By eliminating the traffic conflicts between the successive aircraft on the approach, the 25 mile-in-trail restriction can be reduced to 7 to 10 miles, more than doubling the hourly landing capacity on Runway 29. This reduction will add an additional four to six arrivals per hour and increase peak arrival period capacity by approximately 8-12% when operating on the northeast flow. This will provide some relief of arrival delays into Newark when the delays are a result of volume and airport configuration.
The airlines will experience cost and on time benefits:
The reduction of delays will benefit the financial health of the airlines utilizing Newark, especially Continental Airlines. By improving on time performance, reducing holding pattern fuel burn and diverted flights, the cost of operating aircraft out of Newark will be reduced. Additionally, many carriers use Newark as their gateway to connect with trans-Atlantic and trans-polar flights that are significant revenue generators for the companies. There is a two-fold benefit here; the connecting flights arrive on time and allow passengers to make their connections to the overseas flight, and the long-haul aircraft arrive on time and are available for those passengers.
Passengers benefit:
Ultimately, the public benefits by having flights arrive on time. Passengers arrive at their destinations without extensive ground or in-flight delay and are able to make connections more easily, potentially mitigating some of the stress that has been associated with air travel over the past few years.
Summary
The solutions proposed here will enhance the safety and capacity at Newark Airport while operating on the Northeast flow. The existing operation is subject to three main uncontrolled conflict points and a number of uncertainties that can cause confusion with pilots and controllers. By positively controlling the conflicts and creating inherent separation, the operation becomes more certain and less workload intensive. The publication of the procedure with instrument course guidance puts pilots and controllers “on the same page” allowing each to know what to expect from the other. Safety and efficiency are enhanced and capacity is increased, making this a win-win situation for all parties involved.
OK FAA, IT'S TIME TO FIRE ED MASTERSON FOR HIS VIOLATION OF FEDERAL LAW. His actions jeopardized the lives of the passengers flying in and out of EWR. HE RETALIATED AGAINST A WHISTLEBLOWER WHO WAS PROTECTING THE SAFETY OF AIRCRAFT AT NEWARK AIRPORT. A MSPB JUDGE SAID SO!!!! GET CRACKIN' FAA. TIME FOR THIS GUY TO GO.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)