At Newark Airport we had this little problem with near-collisions of aircraft a few years ago. There were a couple of seriously deficient procedures that needed fixing. I brought these safety problems to Ed Masterson's attention and he basically told me to shove it. One specific safety problem involved the Overhead Runway 29 approach. We had 3 near-collisions in a year while using this wacked-out procedure.
So, what does the Captain Chaos of air traffic control decide to do....He institutes a policy at Newark Airport that BRINGS THE AIRPLANES EVEN CLOSER TOGETHER!! That's right, this idiot believed that if you allow the controllers to get the planes closer together, the near-collisions will go away...WTF!
Yes taxpayers, you pay this numbskull ED MASTERSON over $180,000 plus benefits and bonuses to put you and your family in the path of a jet aircraft hurtling through the air at 200 mph. And by the way - did I tell you a JUDGE RULED HE VIOLATED FEDERAL LAW. Yup, he's still employed by the guardian of the skies - the Federal Aviation Administration.
Well, I'm just a lowly air traffic controller and I don't have a big, fancy "manager" title, but I know that if you have some near-collisions going on that you don't try to put them even closer together.
What I did is actually do an analysis of the procedure and provide an effective solution to eliminate to risk of collision. I wrote a 'white paper' aptly named
Deficient Air Traffic Procedures at Newark Liberty International Airport and their Impacts on Aircraft Safety. I submitted my paper to the House of Representatives - Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: Aviation Subcommittee.
Here is an excerpt from the paper regarding the runway 29 overhead procedure that Ed Masterson screwed up even more.
Issue: Runway 29 Overhead Approach Procedure
Background
The Runway 29 Overhead Approach Procedure is designed to take advantage of the shorter, crossing runway (Runway 29) when Newark Airport is operating on the Northeast flow (Runway 4 Right arrivals). The aircraft for Runway 4 Right approach from the southwest, descending on final for the runway while the Runway 29 arrivals approach from the west travelling eastbound and fly directly over the approaching Runway 4 Right traffic. The eastbound aircraft for then descends and enters a left traffic pattern for Runway 29 prior to the Hudson River. The Local controller then sequences the Runway 29 arrival to fit with the Runway 4 Right arrivals so both aircraft land with the appropriate separation. The Runway 29 aircraft are required to execute visual approaches on this procedure.
Theoretical and Practical Application
The visual approach , in many circumstances, is valuable tool for the air traffic controller. It allows him to reduce separation standards and in some cases relieves him of the burden of providing wake turbulence separation between aircraft. It also reduces workload on approach controllers by removing the obligation of placing an aircraft on an instrument approach to an airport. This frees the controller to work on other safety issues and provide additional services.
In this particular case, the use of the visual approach without published course guidance, approach minima and a valid missed approach/go-around procedure creates unnecessary safety hazards. This complex approach, in the very congested and complex airspace of the New York metropolitan area is not the proper setting for the unregulated use of visual procedures.
This unpublished approach procedure was designed to be used by aircraft operating under Visual Flight Rules (VFR). Aircraft operating under VFR are not required to be separated by the stringent standards associated with Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flights. The current procedure has not been amended to consider the change in users from VFR to IFR flights.
Safety Hazards Associated with the Procedure
There is no published procedure to establish course guidance:
The current structure of the procedure allows for the Runway 29 arrival to approach the airport from almost any angle and any point in space that is west of Newark. The lack of consistency creates unique problems for the Tower Local and Class Bravo Airspace (CBA) controllers. The random appearance of flights at various points requires the controllers to react quickly to resolve any conflict with other aircraft under their control.
The pilots are instructed by the Tower controller to aim for a point at the airport over the Runway 4 “numbers”, the large painted digits at the approach end of the runway. This may seem like a reasonable visual target, but in reality pilots may vary by more than a mile either south or north of the correct position. This inaccuracy causes a potential collision hazard with the aircraft either on the Runway 4 Right approach or with aircraft departing Runway 4 Left. In some rare cases, pilots have deviated by as much as three miles south of the required point while simultaneously descending on the approach. These deviations are serious and place the aircraft directly in the final approach path of the primary runway. Generally, these are cases where a pilot is unfamiliar with Newark Airport and specifically this uncharted approach, causing him to become disoriented.
The approach relies too heavily on visual separation:
When the aircraft approach Newark from the west, the TRACON controller does not provide any radar separation with the Runway 4 Right arrival aircraft. It is incumbent upon the Tower controller to establish either pilot-to-pilot visual separation or he provide the visual separation . Unfortunately, in this configuration and with the workload the controller already has, it is difficult and time consuming to establish either form of visual separation. Many variables such as the aircraft’s profile, weather, controller workload or other factors may prevent the establishment of visual separation. Without the aid of visual separation, the controller is required to maintain the standard three miles lateral separation or 1000 feet vertically. When a controller cannot establish visual separation, he must quickly ensure separation between the aircraft. Unfortunately, the Tower controller is not authorized to climb the inbound aircraft because he does not control the airspace above 2000 feet and he is limited in where he can vector the aircraft by the Teterboro and Morristown arrivals. He is effectively placed in an untenable situation that will likely result in a loss of separation.
There is no built-in separation for contingent events:
Since the approach is not charted, there are no explicit directions for pilots to follow in the event of a contingency. These types of events, such as loss of communications, wrong frequency assignments, loss of radar and any other abnormal event that disrupts the standard operation introduce uncertainty. A controller encountering these situations may not be able to provide separation services to the inbound aircraft raising the potential for a catastrophic event.
Lack of effective transfer of communications and control:
There is guidance for the TRACON controller to transfer control and communications to the Tower controller at eight miles from the airport. Prior to transfer, aircraft are verbally instructed to maintain 2000 feet. At times, pilots cannot visually acquire the airport prior to the eight mile mark and cannot be cleared for the visual approach. In these events, it is common for the TRACON controller to retain control of the aircraft until the pilot can proceed visually to the airport. Unfortunately, when the Tower controller finally receives control and communications, he does not have adequate time to establish the necessary visual or radar separation.
Pilots must fly an unorthodox, unstabilized approach, increasing the risk of missed approaches/go-arounds:
The approach to Runway 29 in this configuration requires the aircraft to fly overhead the field from west to east, making a descending left 180 degree turn to align with the landing runway. Many times, it is necessary for the Tower controller to instruct the pilot to make a shortened approach to sequence with the landing traffic on Runway 4 Right. This maneuver does not allow the pilot to properly stabilize the aircraft for landing and increases the potential for go-arounds. This is especially significant during the autumn when the prevailing wind shifts to the northwest and strong gusts are prevalent.
The routine descent profile is outside normal approach procedure parameters:
The routine application of this procedure allows pilots approximately four miles to descend from 2000 feet to touchdown in a banking left turn with a descent rate of approximately 500 feet per mile. Conversely, the optimum descent rate per mile on final approach is 318 feet per mile with a maximum of 400 feet per mile . This steep descent profile combined with the banked approach adds complexity to the pilot’s approach to the runway.
There is no protected missed approach/go-around (aborted landings) airspace:
Because this is an unpublished visual approach procedure, there is no designated missed approach procedure or protected upwind airspace to safeguard the aircraft if it cannot land. The current procedure does not provide positive separation of aircraft on the upwind leg after an aborted landing.
Missed approaches/Go-arounds directly conflict with Teterboro Runway 6 arrivals:
When an aborted landing occurs, the aircraft is almost immediately endangered by other aircraft landing at Teterboro Airport and also by subsequent aircraft inbound to Newark Airport on the Overhead Runway 29 procedure. Teterboro Airport’s ILS Runway 6 final approach course lies approximately four miles off the departure end of Newark Runway 29. The aircraft on the Teterboro approach and regularly at 2000 feet and will begin descent on the ILS glide path shortly. The aircraft aborting on Runway 29 is on a converging course with those aircraft and is required to climb to a minimum altitude of 1600 feet due to obstacles in the vicinity. As the required separation between these aircraft is three miles laterally or 1000 feet vertically, there is virtually no option for the Newark Tower controller to keep the aircraft safely separated. Additionally, visual separation cannot be applied in this circumstance as it is prohibited by FAA Order 7110.65S 7-2-1 . The result is an almost instant loss of separation, endangering the aircraft involved.
FAA is instructing controllers to misapply VFR separation rules:
FAA management at Newark has instructed controllers to attempt to retain the aircraft aborting the approach in the “VFR pattern” thus supposedly alleviating the controller of the responsibility of providing the necessary radar separation. This technique was previously used during a period when the primary users of this approach were turboprop aircraft operating under Visual Flight Rules (VFR). While this was a legal application of the rules with those aircraft, it is illegal for use with the Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flights that currently utilize the approach. Keeping the IFR aircraft in the visual pattern also places them below the 1600 foot MVA and in violation of FAA regulations.
Also, when conflicting with the Teterboro arrivals, VFR aircraft are not subject to the three mile or 1000 feet separation requirement.
Missed approaches/Go-arounds conflict with other aircraft inbound on this approach:
Aircraft aborting landings on Runway 29 during this operation not only potentially conflict with aircraft on the Teterboro ILS Runway 6 approach, but also with other aircraft conducting the Overhead 29 approach to Newark. There is generally a 25 mile in-trail restriction on aircraft conducting the Overhead Runway 29 approach. This is necessary because an aircraft aborting on Runway 29 is in conflict with the succeeding aircraft on the same approach. These two aircraft are on reciprocal courses and cannot be separated effectively.
Solutions
Properly chart and publish the procedure:
Properly charting and publishing the procedure will standardize its use, ensuring consistency among pilots flying the approach into Newark and reducing confusion. This consistency will allow controllers to handle these aircraft more easily, thus increasing safety and efficiency. Publication of an official approach procedure will also mandate the establishment of acceptable weather minima under which the approach can be conducted. Currently, the operation’s weather minima are subjective and set by the operational supervisor on duty. FAA should develop a charted visual or similar procedure that provides instrument course guidance throughout and a specified point where the pilot must proceed visually or be resequenced.
Provide instrument course guidance:
The current application of the procedure does not dictate a track that aircraft must fly to safely proceed on the approach for Runway 29. Creating a required path to fly will reduce the uncertainty associated with the current operation and mitigate the hazards caused by aircraft drifting north or south of the expected fly-over point on the airfield (i.e. the runway numbers). Course guidance on the track can be provided by a number of navigational aids in the area and can be overlaid with newer technologies like GPS or RNAV for use with NextGen systems. The course guidance should not exclude older existing technologies such as VOR in order to maintain maximum flexibility of use.
Recommendation: In order to provide clearance from the Teterboro ILS Runway 6, Newark Runway 4 Right arrivals and Runway 29 aborted landing airspace, the inbound leg should start at approximately 240 degrees and 10 to 12 miles from the fly-over point.
Build-in vertical separation at conflict points:
The establishment of a track will define the points of conflict and altitude restrictions can be included to ensure separation between aircraft. This addition will reduce the likelihood of separation loss in contingency situations as well as reduce controller workload.
Create a defined transfer of control point:
A defined course and set altitude restrictions will allow for a set transfer point from the TRACON to the Tower. The clarification of the transfer point and definition of each controller’s responsibilities will reduce operational deviations and errors. Transfer errors will be reduced as pilots will expect transfer at a standard point and the frequencies will be included in the chart.
Recommendation: The transfer point should be a point where the pilot is separated from traffic, has acquired visual contact with the airport and can proceed on track.
Reduce the rate of descent on the final segment of the approach:
The new track should include the downwind and base legs of the approach to provide pilots a landing pattern that ensures obstacle clearance and a reasonable descent profile. By establishing a downwind leg length of three miles from the fly-over point to the base leg turn, the effective final segment length is approximately seven miles. This increase in length allows for the fly-over altitude to be raised to approximately 2600 feet and reduces the rate of descent to approximately 370 feet/mile from 500 feet/mile, bringing it within FAA regulation parameters. This change should provide for a more stabilized approach and reduce incidences of aborted landings. Also, the increase in fly-over altitude provides the necessary 1000 feet vertical separation between the inbound and aborting aircraft.
Tower controllers sequencing the Runway 29 arrivals with the Runway 4 Right arrivals may find the task easier with a set pattern as the time from fly-over to touchdown will be more consistent. Currently, the pattern flown by pilots during this operation varies widely and can disrupt the timing of the controller’s sequence. If necessary, controllers may still alter the pattern slightly to accommodate sequencing without greatly compromising the final descent profile. Speed adjustments would also be effective in adjusting the sequence.
Create aborted landing protected zone:
IFR aircraft aborting landings on Runway 29 must climb to at least 1600 feet in order to comply with the minimum vectoring altitude (MVA) in the vicinity of Newark. To ensure separation of the aircraft with the Teterboro ILS 6 traffic, an altitude restriction of 2600 feet must be established on the ILS 6 until the aircraft are laterally separated or the other applicable radar separation can be applied (i.e. divergence).
Alternatively, Teterboro can discontinue the use of the ILS 6 and instead utilize the VOR-DME Runway 6 which does not conflict with Runway 29. Since the Overhead Runway 29 approach is not used during periods of poor weather, the use of the non-precision VOR-DME approach at Teterboro should not present a problem.
Recommendation: Teterboro should use the VOR-DME Runway 6 during the usage of this procedure.
The changes will increase efficiency and reduce delays by reducing mile-in-trail restrictions:
By eliminating the traffic conflicts between the successive aircraft on the approach, the 25 mile-in-trail restriction can be reduced to 7 to 10 miles, more than doubling the hourly landing capacity on Runway 29. This reduction will add an additional four to six arrivals per hour and increase peak arrival period capacity by approximately 8-12% when operating on the northeast flow. This will provide some relief of arrival delays into Newark when the delays are a result of volume and airport configuration.
The airlines will experience cost and on time benefits:
The reduction of delays will benefit the financial health of the airlines utilizing Newark, especially Continental Airlines. By improving on time performance, reducing holding pattern fuel burn and diverted flights, the cost of operating aircraft out of Newark will be reduced. Additionally, many carriers use Newark as their gateway to connect with trans-Atlantic and trans-polar flights that are significant revenue generators for the companies. There is a two-fold benefit here; the connecting flights arrive on time and allow passengers to make their connections to the overseas flight, and the long-haul aircraft arrive on time and are available for those passengers.
Passengers benefit:
Ultimately, the public benefits by having flights arrive on time. Passengers arrive at their destinations without extensive ground or in-flight delay and are able to make connections more easily, potentially mitigating some of the stress that has been associated with air travel over the past few years.
Summary
The solutions proposed here will enhance the safety and capacity at Newark Airport while operating on the Northeast flow. The existing operation is subject to three main uncontrolled conflict points and a number of uncertainties that can cause confusion with pilots and controllers. By positively controlling the conflicts and creating inherent separation, the operation becomes more certain and less workload intensive. The publication of the procedure with instrument course guidance puts pilots and controllers “on the same page” allowing each to know what to expect from the other. Safety and efficiency are enhanced and capacity is increased, making this a win-win situation for all parties involved.
OK FAA, IT'S TIME TO FIRE ED MASTERSON FOR HIS VIOLATION OF FEDERAL LAW. His actions jeopardized the lives of the passengers flying in and out of EWR. HE RETALIATED AGAINST A WHISTLEBLOWER WHO WAS PROTECTING THE SAFETY OF AIRCRAFT AT NEWARK AIRPORT. A MSPB JUDGE SAID SO!!!! GET CRACKIN' FAA. TIME FOR THIS GUY TO GO.
This is page 12 of the December 22, 2009 Merit Systems Protection Board decision by Judge Ruggiero where she ruled that Ed Masterson violated federal law - the Whistleblower Protection Act and committed a Prohibited Personnel Practice under 5 USC 2302(b)(8). Ed Masterson retaliated against a federal whistleblower who disclosed three unsafe air traffic procedures at Newark Liberty Airport. These procedures have now either been corrected, stopped or just no longer used. There haven't been any more near-collisions at Newark Airport since these procedures were corrected or stopped. I think that speaks volumes. In fact, on the one procedure the runway 22 Left/runway 11 simultaneous landings, the incidence of go-arounds (aborted landings) was reduced by 80%. That is a staggering number.
