All,
According to Jim Swanson this morning, there were no operational errors assigned to any controllers by AOV as a result of their recent visit. The last info I had came from Rob Lehmann. I’m gonna consider this a dead issue now. I’m sure these type of things will pop up occasionally, so let’s keep our operation clean. Please contact me if you have an OE or are asked to participate in an investigation.
There are some changes to the way OE’s are handled and I’m doing my homework on them. The NEB has a briefing guide that I will obtain shortly.
Here are the changes from the recent NATCA update:
Information from your Safety Committee reference the changes:
Overview of Changes:
References to any OEs/ODs/PEs are no longer included in your TTD (Technical Training Discussion)
- An employee is no longer associated with any OE/OD/PE documentation. To include the FAA training and Proficiency record (FAA Form 3120-1), Preliminary operational error/deviation investigation report (FAA Form 7210-2), and Final operational error/deviation report (FAA Form 7210-4).
· There is no longer a requirement to remove an employee from position after an OE/OD. While there is no requirement, our CBA still requires that an employee shall be removed from position as soon as possible. There is also a change to paragraph 5-1-3 that explains what they mean. The CBA overrides this order, it is advised that after an incident you take the opportunity to take a breather and clear your head prior to resuming your duties actively controlling traffic. In the event management does not want to relieve you from position, make the request to be relieved.
o Paragraph 5-1-3 of the change states: “Managers should rarely remove employees from any operational position pending the outcome of an OE/OD/PE investigation. For serious safety events or significant performance concerns, it may be necessary to remove an employee from operational duties either at the determination of management or at the request of the employee.”
o The CBA states: Employees shall be relieved from position as soon as operationally possible when the occurrence of an operational error/deviation is known or suspected.
· There is no longer a requirement to interview an employee in an OE/OD investigation. Mr. Hansen suspects that these will continue as indicated in paragraph 5-1-5 of the change, but they should focus more on why an event occurred versus who is going to be blamed for the error.
· Paragraph 5-1-5 of the change states the following:
b. Interviews. To ensure effective safety investigations and analysis it is imperative that all valuable information and insights are gathered from any and all sources. All employees must be aware that the sharing of valuable safety information is a fundamental tenet of a safety culture and a primary function of their job regardless of position. Failure to provide safety information erodes the very foundation of a true safety culture and must be discouraged through available and appropriate means. When conducting interviews, it is crucial that they be conducted in an atmosphere of shared concern that is designed to determine the underlying causes that may be indicative of risk in the NAS. It should be noted that, while certain operational personnel may have taken action(s) or failed to take action(s) that were directly related to the OE/D being reported, management personnel conducting interviews should emphasize the information-gathering purpose of any interview so that as much usable information as possible can be collected. Personnel interviews should be conducted to the extent necessary to determine if an operational error/deviation has actually occurred. In addition, it will at times be necessary to gather additional information from operational personnel that were providing air traffic services during, or were witnesses to, an incident to properly complete FAA Forms 7210-2 and 7210-3. Since many personnel in a facility, e.g., controllers, air traffic assistants, and supervisors may be knowledgeable of, or actually were providing air traffic services during an incident; it is recommended that operational personnel be interviewed as appropriate.
· For management or employees acting in the capacity of a CIC the reporting requirements for most OEs/ODs/PEs is now the next duty day versus the current 4 hour requirement. The 4 hour reporting requirement still applies to those items defined as “significant events”. Significant events are defined as a suspected or actual separation loss, 1) involving Presidential aircraft, members of Congress, or media; or 2) resulting in a Category A OE; or 3) that will likely generate significant media interest.
· There are a lot of changes to paragraph 5-1-8 Performance Based Actions.
o It directs management to conduct performance management on an ongoing basis versus being triggered by an event.
o It includes language for facilities under ATSAP that they must comply with NOTICE 7210.705.
o It also incorporates the language out of Notice 7210.707 that grants employees’ protection from discipline for filing a NASA ASRS report within 10 days of an event, was inadvertent, and did not violate Section 609 of the Federal Aviation Act.
· The employee no longer receives a copy of the final OE package; however, the Principal Union Representative will receive the package, and will have 5 days to submit comments or recommendations to the ATM.
· The following paragraphs were deleted in their entirety: (according to the agency they were deleted for the following reason ---- “These paragraphs were deleted to reflect that individuals are not named in the OE/OD report and that training should be accomplished IAW agency directives and the CBA.”)
5-1-9 RETURN TO OPERATIONAL DUTY
5-1-10 WHEN THE AIR TRAFFIC MANAGER IS INVOLVED
5-1-11 FOLLOW-UP PERFORMANCE SKILL CHECK
5-1-12 SKILL ENHANCEMENT TRAINING
Ray
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